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All the  top international  trade  people  have  contributed  to this
volume  --  except  four  and those  four  have  provided  blurbs  for  the  dust  cover,
saying  it is  a great  book.  Perhaps  it is  great,  and  surely  the  book  is
representative  of contemporary  analysis  of trade  restrictions.  Published  in
it  are  8 papers  by many  of the  major  contributors  to the  new  economics  of
trade  restrictions  --  Dixit,  Krugman,  Srinivasan,  Magee-Young,  Dornbusch-
Frankel,  Cooper,  Deardorff-Stern,  Corden. One  chapter  is  by a lawyer,  John  H.
Jackson,  but  is  not  at all  out  of place  in the  volume. There  are  2  "Comments"
on each  chapter  except  Corden's,  (several  by leading  political  scientists)  and
an "Introduction"  providing  a  good summary  of each  of the  9 chapters. These
papers  and  comments  were  presented  at a symposium  at the  University  of
Michigan  --  one  of several  initiatives  of the  university's  regents  and
president  "to  bring  faculty  expertise  to  bear  on some  of the  economic  and
social  challenges  facing  [the  state  of)  Michigan."  (p.  vii).
While  the  book  is  a collection  of chapters  by  different  authors,  the
chapters  tend  to speak  with  one  voice,  which  I will  interpret  as the  voice  of
the  archetype  or  representative  practitioner  of contemporary  economic  analysis
of trade  restrictions.  Those  of us  who  work in  this  area  but  dii  not
participate  in the  University  of Michigan  symposium  should  be proud  to
consider  these  who  contributed  to  this  volume  as representative  of our
a/  The  book  under  review  here  is  U.S.  Trade  Policies  in  a Changing  World
Economy,  Robert  M. Stern,  editor,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  MIT  Press,  437  pp.-2-
group.  I hope also for acceptance of another of my presumptions  --  that this
book  is representative  of our  analysis  and  of our  communicating  this  analysis
out  of our  group,  say  to  persons  who  might  be,  among  other  things,  regents  of
a leading  university. I  will  then  treat  the  book  as  "our"  collective  product.
Besides  attempting  to inform  you  of tihe  book's  contents,  I  want  in
this  review  to  make  three  cowments  about  "us,"  to  wit:
- We produce a quality product.
- We sell it very poorly.
- We place  self-destructively  narrow  limits  on the  topics  we will
analyse.
I.  SUBSTANCE
In substance,  the  material  in the  book  relates  to  3 distinguishable,
though  overlapping  questions:
1. Are there  identifiable  circumstances  in  which  a trade  restriction  has
greater  economic  benefits  than  costs,  i.e.,  are  there  significant  holes  in the
case  for  free  trade?
2.  Why  are  trade  restrictions  imposed,  i.e.,  what  are  the  circumstances
that  lead  to them  being  imposed  (rather  than  the  effects  that  follow  from
them)?
3.  How  do trade  policy  actions  of one  state  affect  the  actions  of other
states,  and  how  can  this  knowledge  be used  to  make  the  collective  trade  policy
outcome  better?-3-
The  Caae  Against  Free  Trade
Se.veral  of the  chapters  together  provide  a careful  review  of the
t!new"  rationales  For  import  restrictions:
(a) Firms  in  imperfectly  competitive  industries  earn  excess
profits,  or rents,  that  well-designed  trade  interventions  might
redirect  from  foreign  to  domestic  firms;  this  "unrequited
transfer"  providing  a net  benefit  to the  national  economic
interest.
(b)  Some  sectors  are  "critica"'  to the  development  or efficiency  of
the  rest  of the  economy,  i.e.,  generate  externalities,  b,.  fits
for  the  rest  of the  economy  beyond  those  captured  by the
sector's  sales  revenues.
Profit-capturing  trade  intervention  is  examined  in  the  chapter  by
Alan  V. Deardorft  and  Robert  M. Stern,  also  in  Paul  Krugman's  chapter. Each
chapter  points  out  that  it  is  difficult  to identify  the  circumstances  in  which
there  is  profit  to  be captured  by trade  intervention  --  in part  because  trade
increases  the  degree  of competition  in  any  sector  (a  point  also  made  by
Avinash  Dixit). Furthermore,  it is  not  easy  to  design  the  appropriate
policy. Depending  on criteria  that  are  hard  to  make  operational,  a tariff
will  sometime  capture  the  foreign  profit  while  a quota  will  give  away  the
domestic,  or vice  versa. Another  critical  point  is  well  summarized  by Gary  R.
Saxonhouse  "...capturing  a strategic  sector  and  its  attendant  economic  rents
may  be  very important  for  firm  equity  holders  without  being  of  much
significance  for  the  economy  as  a whole."  (p.  241)
As to  th3  case  for  critical  sectors,  Paul  Krugman  points  out that
this  argument  is,  analytically,  a rediscovery  of  the  "structuralist"  view  of- 4 -
economic  development,  a somewhat  faded  view  that  was  debated  in the  1950's  and
1960's. And  Krugman  adds,  for  a country's  international  position  in  a
critical  industry  to affect  the  country's  position  in other  sectors,  "external
economies  must  be country  specific  --  and  in  many  cases  they  are  not.
Knowledge  diffuses  across  international  boundaries;  intermediate  goods  can  be
traded. Whenever  the  external  economies  are international  in  scope,  special
concern  about  svzstaining  sectors  in international  competition  is  misplaced."
(p.  231).  Gary  Saxonhouse  points  out  that  the  same  argument  is presented  in
Marshall's  Principles  against  much the  same  rationale  for  government  inter-
vention.
T.N.  Srinivasan's  essay  reviews  the  case  for  trade  intervention  in
favor  of sectors  that  produce  "noneconomic"  externalities,  such  as  national
defense. An import  tariff,  he reminds  us, is  a tax  on consumption  and  a
subsidy  to  production,  an expert  duty  the  converse. If  national  defense  is
related  to  production  or consumption  of something  (e.g,  guns)  a trade  tax  or
subsidy  is  not  the  least  cost  way to  achieve  it.  Only  when security
objectives  directly  involve  the  amount  of foreign  trade  is  a trade
intervention  the  best  policy. The  principle  underlying  this  leads  to
straightforward  policy  advice,  "Tax  or subsidize  precisely  what  you  want less
or more  of." The  simplicity  of the  good sense  of this  should  not  cause  one to
overlook  its  importance  or its  wide  applicability.
In sum,  the  book  breaks  the  new  rationale  for  trade  intervention  into
analyzable  parts,  and  shows  that  none  of the  parts  hold  up under  careful
analysis. This  new  rationale,  it  turns  out, is  not  very  new,  nor  is it  very
rational.-5-
While  this  volume  does  not  make the  point,  this  is  not  the  first  time
the  case  for  free  trade  has  survived  challenges  to its  assumptions.
Haberler's  Theory  of International  Trade,  published  in  1936,  demonstrated  that
the  labor  theory  of  value  was  not  a critical  assumption.  Ron  Findlay  in  a
recent  review  of a c3llection  of Haberler's  papers  points  out  that  "Haberler's
celebrated  1950  Economic  Journal  article  on 'Some  Problems  in the  Pure  Theory
of International  Trade'  ...  was  the  product  of irritation  initiated  by  Thomas
Balogh's  belief  that  the  familiar  list  of unrealistic  assumptions  usually  made
in expounding  the  theory  of comparative  advantage  and  the  associated  case  for
free  trade  [is]  logically  necessary  for  the  validity  of the  conclusion."
(Findlay,  p. 1347)
Determinants  of Protection
The  book  provides  a less  complete  review  of this  topic. In one
chapter,  Rudiger  DornbLsch  and  Jacob  Frankel  examine  possible  macroeconomic
determinants  of protection  and  conclude  that  "net  foreign  demand  is  a more
important  determinant  of protectionism  than  domestic  demat.d."  (p.  99)  While
protection  might  provide  an import-competing  industry  with  "relief"  from  a
decline  of domestic  demand  as  well  as from  an increase  of foreign  competition,
the  direct  import  of this  finding  is that  protection  is,  in  the  main,  provided
only  to  offset  losses  of sales  to foreign  competition;  not to  compensate  for
losses  attributable  to  an internal  cause  such  as a shift  of demand  away  from
the  product.
Dornbusch  and  Frankel  also  examine  the  influence  on net  demand  for  US
manufactured  goods  of the  1980's  overvaluation  of the  dollar  and,  by
implication  (through  the  previously  demonstrated  link  between  net foreign
demand  and  protection),  the  influence  of dollar  overvaluation  on  US- 6 -
protectionism.  They  find  that  in some  industries  the  real  dollar  exchang'_
rate  is  significantly  correlated  over  time  with  empluyment  (steel,  metal
fasteners,  but  not in  the  autos  or textiles  industry)  and in  these  cases
offers  "some  support  for  the  hypothef;;  chat  the  overvalued  dollar  explains
recent  protectionist  actions."  (p.  112) (Additional  evidence  on the  link
between  the  exchange  rate  and  employment  is cited  by  William  Branson,  in  his
comment.) They  then  ask  why,  if  overvaluation  of the  dollar  leads  to
protection  in  the  US, the  inverse  undervaluation  of trading  partner  currencies
does  not  reduce  protection  in  those  countries? Several  ad hoc  explanations
are  offered,  e.g.,  an exogenous  increase  of protectionist  sentiment,  a  ratchet
effect.
Stephen  P.  Magee  and  Leslie  Young  present  protection  in  the  US since
1900  as the  outcome  of "maximizing,  self-interested  behavior  by all  of the
economic  agents,  lobbies,  political  parties,  and  voters"  (p.  147),  but  their
exercise  provides  little  insight  into  the  what  or  why  of trade  restrictions.
Edward  Leamer  in  his  comment  on the  chapter  lists  9  points  on which  Magee-
Young's  assumptions  do great  violence  to  reality. Milton  Friedman  has
observed,  Leamer  reminds  us, that  useful  theories  often  have  unrealistic
assumptions.  But,  Leamer  chides  Magee-Young,  Priedman's  observation  does  not
mean  that  the  unreality  of  one's  model  assures  its  predictive  usefulness. In
this  case  not  only  are  the  assumptions  unreal,  the  predictions  are  bizarre  --
described  by  Magee-Young  themselves  as 3  "paradoxes,"  2 "ironies,"  1
"conflict"  and 1  "surprise."
Perhaps  the  major  lesson  the  book  provides  on the  determinants  of
trade  policy  is that  trade  policy  is  often  aimed  at noneconomic  objectives.
War is  the  pursuit  of diplomacy  through  other  means  --  trade  policy  too,points  out  Richard  Cooper,  whose  chapter  explains  that  over  US history  trade
policy  has  had  considerable  importance  for  and  influence  on major  foreign
policy  questions. Creating  a national  identity  was,  in  our  early  histcry,  an
important  object  of trade  policy,  e.g.,  trade  boycotts  during  colonial  days  to
protest  the  Stamp  Act  and the  Townsend  Act.  Cooper  sees  trade  policy  from
about  1820  to  WWII  as  aimed  chief  .y  at trade  objectives  --  to  protect  US
manufacturing  and  at the  same  time  promote  US exports. After  WWII  came
liberalization  under  the  GATT,  liberalization  motivated  more  by a desire  to
preserve  peace  and  to  assure  international  stability  through  economic  means
than  by an  appreciation  of the  economic  gains  from  trade.
Several  chapters  review  historical  attempts  by the  US to use  trade
embargoes  to influence  the  economic,  political  or military  behavior  of other
countries. Examples  are  the  1965-78  trade  embargo  against  Rhodesia,  the  trade
embargo  to protest  the  Stamp  Act  imposed  on the  American  colonies  by  Great
Britain,  the  Jackson-Vanik  amendment  of 1974,  seeking  increased  Jewish
emigration  from  the  Soviet  Union,  various  trade  and  financial  measures  against
Iran  in  an  attempt  to gaOn  release  of American  hostages. Such sanctions  have
had  diverse  and zometimes  imprecise  objectives,  and  there  are several
disagreements  among  authors  as to whether  or not  a particular  sanction
achieved  its  objective.
Much  of this  discussion  draws  on information  from  Gary  Hufbauer  and
Jeffrey  Schott's  book  on  US export  sanctions  and  ends  up  more  or less  with
their  conclusion  --  in  about  1  case  in 3 sanctions  were  successful  in  achiev-
ing  their  objective. Is this  a good  or  a bad  score? Stephen  Krasner's  eva-
luation  is,  "Since  economic  sanctions  are  likely  to  be used  only  when  other
policy  instruments  fail,  this  level  of success  is indeed  surprising."  (p.  329)No  attempt  is  made to  attach  a  dollars  and  cents  value  to these  foreign  policy
objectives  or to identify  the  costs  of the  policies  put  in  place  in pursuit  of
them,  i.e.,  the  test  applied  is "Did  they  work?"  rather  than  the  more
stringent  economic  test  "Was  it  worth  it?"
Policy  Interactions
Avinash  Dixit's  chapter,  titled,  "How  Should  the  United  States
Respond  to Other  Countries'  Trade  Policies?"  provides  an  excellent  introduc-
tion  to  the  relevant  literature.  Dixit  divides  the  question  into  two  parts:
(a)  the  best  reaction  to  foreign  policies,  giver.  that  the  US policy
choi'e  will  not  affect  trading  partners'  policy  choices;
(b) how  US policy  actions  will  influence  the  policy  choices  of
trading  partners.
Dixit's  reading  of  relevant  research  is that  our  trading  partners'  policies
are  not  "predatory"  --  will  not,  in  the  long  run,  leave  the  US in  a position
to be  exploited  by foreign  monopoly  sellers  of products  we import. The  best
reaction  then  to foreign  trade  policies  is  "None  at  all."  This  does  not  imply
that  the  US should  have  no trade  policy  --  rather,  that  the  wisdom  of US trade
policy  is  a  matter  of how  US policy  affects  US interests,  given  existing
circumstances,  not  of how  foreign  policies  have  affected  these  circumstances.
Most  of Dixit's  chapter,  and  a major  part  of Deardorff  and  Stern's
discuss  how  one  country's  policy  actions  will  influence  the  policy  choices  of
others. Attention  centers  on Prisoners'  Dilemma  situations  --  if  no  country
restricts  trade,  each  is better  off  than  if  all  restrict,  yet  whatever  other
countries  do (restrict  or  not)  an individual  country  would  benefit  from
restricting.  Thus  collective  action,  in  the  form  of an effective  agreement  by
all  not  to restrict,  is  better  than  the  end  result  of each  country  independently- 9  -
choosing  the  policy  best  for  itself. But  how,  among  sovereign  states,  does  one
make  effective  such  a free  trade  agreement? Two policy  principles  are  endorsed
by several  authors. One  of these  is policy  rules  (rather  than  administrative
discretion);  i.e.,  "Policy  mechanisms  should  be based  on firmer  and  clearer
rules  and  allow  less  discretion  after  the  fact."  (p.  279) The  other  is tit-
for-tat  responses,  i.e.,  "Work  on this  problem  [the  Prisoners'  Dilemma]
suggests  the  desirability  of being  committed  to  retaliation."  (p.  62)
here  are several  endorsements  of these  policy  principles,  an<+
couple  of other  (not  necessarily  conflicting)  prescriptions.  Robert  Keohane
suggests  "mi.ed  strategies  that  combine  the  openness  ...  of unconditional  mFN
with the  incentives  to  cooperate  inherent  in  reciprocity"  (p.  405),  John
Jackson  favors  "dispute  settlement,  norm  formation,  and  a number  of other
procedures  ...  that  can  effectively  manage  interdependence  in today's  complex
world"  (p.  395),  and  Max  Corden  offers  a 6-element  sketch  of  a new
multilateral  trade  agreement.
There  is  not  much  policy  analysis. Other  than  a comment  or two  that
the  recent  increase  of trade  restrictions  is  because  "important  members  ...
bypass  or ignore  GATT  authority  and  obligations"  (p.  3)  and  because  the  GATT
"contained  several  loopholes  and  escape  clauses  that  could  be misused  and  duly
were"  (p.  245)  the  book  provides  no attempt  to interpret  current  policy  or
policy-making  process  in  the  light  of the  principles  it endorses.- 10  -
II.  DELIVERY
Economic  theory  has  great  power  to  clarify  important  issues  of  public
policy,  but  its  application  to such  issues  by  contemporary  economists  does  not
often  demonstrate  this  power  to the  policy  community. "All  the  economists  of
the  world  if  laid  end-to-end,  would  not  reach  a conclusion,"  is  a jibe  we have
all  suffered. It is  unfortunate,  but  this  book  does  more to  demonstrate  that
such  criticism  is  warranted  than  to set  it  aside. One such  demonstration  is
that  the  book  fails  to  argue  a conclusion  that  it,  in substance,  very strongly
supports. Furthermore,  it  flaunts  inconclusiveness  as if it  were  one  of our
tribal  values  --  "As  might  be expected  from  an economist,  I  have  produced  a
catalog  of alternatives  instead  of a clear  answer."  (p.  279),  and  "I  aim  to con-
tribute  to  clarification  rather  than  urge  a particular  point  of  view."  (p.  413)
As to  what  it  might  have  concluded,  the  book  provides  the  blows  to
pound  the  stuffing  out  of the  "new"  reasons  for  import  restrictions,  but  it
uses  this  reasoning  in  an almost  apelogetic  way  to present  the  case  for  free
trade. The  "case  against"  is  clearly  stated,  e.8.:
"What  should  we as international  trade  economists  be  advising
policymakers  to  do?  The  classical  case  for  the  gains  from
trade  is  not  very  helpful  in  this  regard  since  it  posits  a
world  so far  removed  from  the  reality  in  which  policymakers
have  to operate.  ....  [T]he  theoretical  developmenrs  [reviewed
in  the  book]  indicate  that  our  profession  is  beginning  to
confrort  many  of the  complexities  of the 'real  world'. The- 11  -
answers  are  only  beginning  to  emerge,  but  the  progress  being
made is  encouraging  nonetheless."  (p.  16)
[Tlhe  conventional  economist's  wisdom  is open  to challenge,  for
it is  based  on insecure  foundations.  In particular,  the
assumptions  that  competition  is  perfect,  on the  one  side,  and
that  private  and  social  returns  are  equal,  on the  other,  are
clearly  untrue."  (p.  208)
The  "conclusion  for"  is  much  less  forceful:
"[A]lthough  recent  arguments  for  trade  intervention  have  been
diverse,  we do  not  consider  them  as sufficient  grounds  for
seriously  compromising  or rejecting  outright  the  principles  of
free  trade  as the  basis  for  trade  policy."  (p.  34)
Compare  the  following  argumer.t:
Ay, tear  her tattered  ensign  downl
Long  has  it  waved  on  high
And  many  an  eye  has  danced  to se)
That  banner  in  the  sky;
Her  deck,  once  red  with  heroes'  blood,
Where  knelt  the  -anquished  foe,
Where  winds  were  hurrying  o'er  the  flood,
And  waves  were  white  below,- 12  -
No more shall  feel  the  victor's  tread,
Or know the conquered knee; --
The  harpies  of the  shore  shall  pluck
The eagle  of the  sea.
When  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  wrote  these  words  (in  1830),  the  US  Navy  was  about
to sell  "Old  Ironsides"  for  scrap. Her  oak  and  canvas  it  seemed,  were
irrelevant  to contemporaneous  conditions.  Yet  "Old  Ironsides"  was saved  and
still  floats  in Boston  harbor. Holmes'  counterargument  had  little  substance,
but  it  moved  a  nation  to action. At the  other  extreme,  the  analysis  in the
book  under  review  is  precise,  careful,  fair-minded,  even  generous. It shows
in substance,  that  through  st3rms  of rent-snatching  and  minefields  of
externalities,  "Free  Trade"  sails  robustly  on.
But  in form  it  praises  through  many  verses  the  harpies  of the  shore
--  then  in  the  end  admits  that  the  eagle  got  away. Its  substance  is  betrayed
by argumentation  that  is feckless,  devoid  of spirit.
The  last  matter  I  want to  take  up in this  review  is  the  limits  we
place  on what  we will  analyze. As noted  above,  the  book  delivers  policy
advice,  but  little  policy  analysis  (except  for  John  Jackson's  legal
analysis). There  is  no inconsistency  here,  because  the  advice  is  given  at a
level  of abstraction  above  institutional  context,  and  actual  policy  is,  of
course,  a part  of the  institutional  structure.  The  policy  principles  the  book
advances --  (a) tit-for-tat  responses and (b)  rules, not discretion --  are
suggested  as  desirable  characteristics  of any  policy-making  apparatus,
whatever  its  particular  legal  or administrative  forms  might  be.- 13  -
These  policy  principles,  when  projected  into  the  environment  of
policy  and  policy  process,  however  lead  to ambiguous  endorsements  of  what is
good  or bad.  For  example,  US trade  law  provides  "rules"  of the  form  "If
condition  'A'  exists  in industry  'N',  then  the  US  government  will  restrict
imports  sufficiently  to offset  that  condition."  (Such  "trade  remedies,"  e.g.,
safeguards,  antidumping  and  other  such  procedures,  are  explicitly  condoned  by
the  GATT.) The law  allows  the  President  to  set  aside  some  determinations  that
a "remediable"  condition  exists,  and  not impose  an import  restriction.
An increase  of protection,  in this  institutional  environment,  often
takes  the  form  of Congress  passing  a law  that  adds  to the  list  of "remedi-
able"  conditions  and  that  crimps  the  President's  discretionary  authority  to
set  "remedies"  aside  --  by  expanding  what is  covered  by rules,  conLracting
what  is  covered  by discretion.  To call  fot  "Rules,  not  discretion"  is then  to
endorse  the  protectionist  element  in  every  trade  bill  the  US Congress  has
passed  since  WWII.
As to tit-for-tat  responses,  the  GATT-founding  fathers  wanted  to
prevent  countries  from  following  automatic  retaliation  rules. The  GATT tries
to interject  international  discussion  into  national  decisions  to  retaliate.
Through  discussions  of possible  effects  and  appeal  to the  agreed  international
standard,  perhaps  the  "first"  country  might  be convinced  to repeal  or  reduce
its  action,  or the  "second"  convinced  not  to contribute  to successive  rounds
of beggar-thy-neighbor  protection.  If  the  GATT  process  is followed,  there  are
bilateral  consultations,  independent  fact-finding,  legal  interpretation,  and
multilateral  discussion  --  after  which  retaliation  might  be authorized  by vote
of the  GATT-contracting  parties. A law  requiring  tit-for-tat  retaliation  put
in  place,  say,  by  adding,  in  US law,  foreign  countries'  trade  restrictions  to- 14  -
the  list  of remediable  conditions,  would  be  quite  contrary  to the  intent  of
the  GATT.
In sum,  the  GATT  clearly  tries  to discourage  countries  from  acting
according  to  an automatic  rule  for  retaliation,  and  it condones  "if-then"
rules  of  national  behavior  that  prescribe  import  relief  whew  certain
conditions  exist  in  a domestic  industry. The  two  principles  of policy  advice
that  this  book  brings  forward,  "Rules,  not  discretion,"  and  "Tit-for-tat
retaliation,"  could  be used  both  to endorse  most  of the  protectionist
legislation  submitted  to the  US Congress  in  the  past  20 years,  and to indict
the  GATT  as  wrong-headed.
This  is probably  not  our intent  but  rather,  a result  of  policy
interpretation  made for  the  convenience  of analytical  models  rather  than
analysis  fitted  to the  facts  of policy. A  more pointed  example  of our
instinct  for  what is the  "horse"  and  what  the  "cart"  of economic  analysis  is
the  attention  the  book  devotes  to questions  of trade  strategy  in  a Prisoner's
Dilemma  situation  --  in  which  a country's  national  economic  interest  is
augmented  by its  trade  restrictions.  (In  the  subject  index  there  are  3
references  under  "Trade  liberalization,"  1  under  "Free  trade,"  and 13  under
"Prisoner's  Dilemma.") Though  another  part  of the  book  argues  carefully
against  the  new  rationale  for  trade  intervention,  there  are  no objections  to
the  relevance  of the  assumption  that  a country  benefits  from  its  trade
restrictions,  and  no suggestions  that  the  "dilemma"  be resolved  by advising
that  unilateral  restrictions  do not  serve  the  national  interest. The  possible
exception  is  a backhander  from  Paul  Krugman,  "I  would  be surprised  if  a
vigorous  attempt  to  apply  the  principle  of optimal  intervention  would  not
actually  lead  to considerably  freer  trade  than  we now  have."  (p.  231)- 15  -
If we assume  that  our  sympathy  for  the  GATT  or our  antipathy  for  a
particular  trade  law  follows  logically  from  polity  principles  such  as this
book  recommends,  then  our  policy  advice  will  be,  in the  policymaking
environment,  not  only  abstract,  but  arbitrarily  --  big  on preaching  what
policy  should  be,  but  weak on  observation,  i.e.,  knowing  what it in  fact  is.
We then  come  across  somewhat  pompously  --  like  a shopper  who  has  his  proud  say
on price  but,  not  knowing  the  currency,  must  trust  the  seller  to count  out  the
appropriato  zoins  from  his  purse.
Yet  our  tendency  is to  avoid  the  task  of fitting  together  our  policy
principles  and  the  institutional  context. The  aphorism  "Theory  is  made  by
first-rate  minds,  translated  into  policy  by second-rate  minds,  and  third-rate
minds  then  apply  that  policy"  is  les2  a positive  statement  than  a normative
one.  It  specifies  how  our  job  classifications  map  us into  our  pecking  order.
The  accompanying  presumption,  that  our  policy  principles  will  then  be
applied  by a  grateful  policy  community,  is  unwarranted.  For  a sophisticated
product  to  gain  a wide  market,  its  user  characteristics  must  be designed  in,
not  added  on after. Only commodities  are  marketed  otherwise,  and  as policy
advisors,  we are  no longer  in the  commodities  business. (Someone  familiar
with  Adam  Smith  or  Alfred  Marshall  might  insist  that  we never  were.)
A recent  cartoon  makes  the  same  point. In it,  a  group  of British
businessmenu  face  a group  of Japanese  buyers. One  of the  British  is  wearing
earphones,  connected  to  tw'o  enormous  packs,  one  strapped  to  his  chest,  the
other  to  his  back. The  capcion  asks  "The  new  British  lightweight  walkman,  for
instancel Why  won't  you  people  buy  it?"
The  community  that  makes  and  applies  economic  policy  --  does  it  have
any  choice  but  to  understand  policy  principles  at the  ltvel  of abstraction- 16  -
professiornal  economists  want  to  provide  them,  then  fit  them  to the  relevant
institutional  context? Of course  it does. Few  people  achieve  policy-making
authority  by insisting  that  they  do  not  know  the  basis  for  it,  and  few  of them
are  professional  economists.  David  Henderson's  amusing  and informative  book
gives  many  examples  of the  dominance  of  "home-made"  economics  in the  policy
process. These  do-it-yourselfers  would  hardly  recognize  that  understanding
and  applying  good  economics  is  an alternative,  much less  be inclined  to choose
that  alternative.
To sum  up,  much  of  what  is in this  book  makes  much  better  sense  than
the  logic  that  usually  underlies  the  making  of trade  policy. But  the  book
speaks  only  to  well-trained  economists.  Much  of  what is  wrong  in the  book
could  be fixed  by  a determined  concern  to  write  better. Clarity  and
inconclusiveness,  my English  teachers  taught  me,  are  substitutes,  not
complements.  If  we were  all.  forced  to  meet  the  demands  of a very  tough
English  teacher  we would  end  up writing  better  economics.- 17  -
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